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Introduction
In market societies, people routinely have to transact with faceless corporations about whom they have little personal knowledge. In such societies, external auditing is promoted as a trust engendering technology with a capacity to promote a particular kind of social order (Power, 1999) . It is actively promoted by the state and not only corporations, but significant noncorporate entities are also required by law (e.g. UK Companies Acts) to embrace such technologies. However, confidence in corporate auditing and auditor claims of being able to construct an objective state of the financial affairs of business enterprises are routinely undermined by unexpected corporate collapses, frauds, financial scandals and general crisis of capitalism. At such times, the state, accountancy trade associations and significant others seek to reconstruct confidence in auditing by tweaking institutional structures, regulatory apparatuses, codes of ethics and disciplinary arrangements for errant auditors (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) .
Following revelations of frauds and collapse of US giants Enron and
WorldCom, the usual flurry of political activity enacted the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 2002 (for a critique see Burrowes et al., 2004) , which sought to strengthen auditor independence by introducing some restraints on the auditor's ability to sell consultancy services to audit clients 1 . It also created the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board (PCAOB); an organisation specifically charged with oversight of the auditors auditing US public companies. In the UK, to shore up public confidence in auditor independence, the Auditing Practices Board issued revised ethical standards (Auditing Practices Board, 2004a) .
The role of the Financial Reporting Council (FRC), the main regulators responsible for accounting and auditing regulation, and its various arms, was strengthened. In particular, an Audit Inspection Unit 2 (AIU) was formed for monitoring of the audits of all listed and other major public companies. The
Companies Act 2006 beefed up auditor rights and powers in relation to information from employees, officers, directors and subsidiaries. At the same time issues about the efficacy of the basic auditing model, accountability and governance of auditing firms, the auditability of global businesses and some emerging assets (e.g. complex financial instruments) received scant attention (Sikka, 2004) .
Since late (Sikka and Willmott, 1995) suggests that the accounting industry will seek to manage the crisis by revising 3 http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/business/7313637.stm accounting/auditing standards and ethical codes 5 rather than undertaking major reforms.
A comprehensive critique of the politics and problems of auditing is beyond the scope of the present paper. However it seeks to encourage debate by focusing on three issues, which are deeply embedded within the current auditing practices. These relate to the appropriateness of the basic auditing model, quality of audits and verifiability of financial statements. The auditing model, it is argued, is fundamentally flawed as it makes auditors' financially dependent upon companies and persuades them to prioritise their own economic interests at the expense of other parties which may have an interest in audits. In professional circles, audit quality is frequently associated with using appropriate techniques. Such a focus neglects the organisational and social context of auditing and thus little attention is paid to how audits are manufactured, or the incentives to auditors to produce good audits.
Traditionally auditors have conducted ex-post audits and the main objective has been to verify income, expenses, assets and liabilities, which have generally been the outcome of past transactions. However, the intensification of finance capitalism has produced new complex financial instruments whose value is dependent on uncertain future events and market volatility. It is doubtful that auditors have the requisite expertise to deal with the challenges posed by shifts in capitalism.
To address the above issues, the paper is organised into three further sections. The next section offers some perspectives on company auditing. In particular, it argues that theories supporting the need for external auditing expect auditors to be independent of the company and its directors. Auditors are also expected to have pressures and incentives to deliver good quality audits. The second section addresses three themes outlined above. Firstly, it provides some evidence to support the argument that due to flaws in the basic auditing models auditors have become financially dependent on companies and cannot deliver independent audits. Secondly, it argues that the association of audit quality with techniques neglects the organisational and social context of auditing. Some evidence is provided to argue that current practices are unlikely to result in good audits. Thirdly, it is argued that the traditional approaches to auditing may not be appropriate for dealing with the consequences of finance capitalism, especially as they thrive on future prices and market volatility. Therefore, it is doubtful that the resulting financial statements can be audited in any objective way. The third section concludes the paper by a summary and discussion of the issues raised. It also sketches out some possible reforms.
Perspectives on Company Audits
Agency theory is frequently mobilised to explain the rationale behind company audits (Benston, 1985; Arnold and de Lange, 2004) . The theory (Jensen and Meckling, 1976 (Benston, 1985; Watts and Zimmerman, 1983) .
Agency theory does not offer guidance on what an 'expert' is and how claims of expertise are enacted since these are shaped by broader social power and politics. It s widely acknowledged that through a variety of strategies accountants have mobilised the state to advance their credentials as experts and secure control of the external auditing jurisdiction (Larson, 1977; Johnson, 1982; Robson and Cooper, 1990 In common with tax, customs, health and safety, hygiene, immigration and other inspectors, company auditors could be appointed by the state, but the dominant neoliberal ideology limits its role in the economic sphere (Harvey, 2005) . Under such circumstances, companies, in effect company directors, search and select auditors though their final appointment may be rubberstamped by shareholders at annual general meetings. There is a concern that directors may shop for audit opinions and prefer to hire more compliant auditors (Lennox, 2000) .
In market societies, auditors are remunerated by the client company rather than by an independent body. This, inevitably, makes them dependent upon directors for their fees and profits. Auditing firms may legitimise their status by appealing to 'professionalism', but in common with other capitalist enterprises they seek to increase profits and market share. As Hanlon (1994) notes, within major accounting firms the "emphasis is very firmly on being commercial and on performing a service for the customer rather than on being public spirited on behalf of either the public or the state" (p. 150). Auditing firms have used their control of the auditing markets to colonise adjacent markets to sell consultancy services to audit clients. The profit motive informs the dynamics of accounting firms. As a partner of a major accountancy firm put it, "a firm like ours is a commercial organization and the bottom line is that …... first of all the individual must contribute to the profitability of the business.
In part that is bringing in business but essentially profitability is based upon the ability to serve existing clients well" (Hanlon, 1994, p. 121) . In essence, the auditing model requires one set of entrepreneurs (auditors) to watch over another set of entrepreneurs (directors). The success of both is measured by revenues, profits and market shares rather than by pursuit of any broader social goals.
The commercialisation of audits produces fault-lines. It makes auditors dependent upon company directors for their fees and as a result they may not be able to retain sufficient distance to deliver independent audits. They may also develop strategies that maximise auditor profits, possibly by performing less stringent audits or by developing strategies which increase private profits but reduce audit quality. In capitalist societies, all economic surpluses need to be accounted, allocated and distributed to the absent capitalists. In this context, auditing processes 'watch over capital', checking and controlling the processes associated with the enlargement of capital (Johnson, 1982) . Such processes require constant vigilance, especially as capitalism mutates. In the era of mercantilism and industrial capitalism, auditors developed technologies for ex-post verification of financial statements that primarily relied upon past transactions to verify income, expenses, assets, liabilities and other components of financial statements. However, the shift to finance capitalism poses numerous challenges as property rights and profits are derived from intellectual property, speculation and complex financial instruments whose value is dependent upon future market volatility. In a globalised economy, money itself is valued as a commodity and bears little relationship to the real economy. Due to technological changes money can almost instantaneously roam the world.
The changes in the nature of capitalism pose new challenges to the value of ex-post audits and traditional auditing technologies. Yet the broader social context of auditing does not form any part of auditing education (Sikka et al., 2007) or the regulatory reports (PCAOB, 2007a (PCAOB, , 2007b (PCAOB, ,2007c (PCAOB, , 2007d .
AUDITING PRACTICES
This section engages with three key issues: flaws in the current auditing model which make auditors financially dependent upon companies; the neglect of organisational and social context of auditing in discussions of audit quality; and some challenges posed by intensification of finance capitalism.
The Auditing Model
The contemporary auditing model makes auditors dependent on companies and their directors for fees and profits. As a result, auditors may become too subservient to directors and even 'bend the rules' to accommodate directors (Sikka, 2008a) . One commentator noted that "In the Enron debacle, one of the most disturbing disclosures was that Arthur Andersen's technical accounting experts were overruled by the engagement partners in Houston, allowing accounting decisions to be approved even though Andersen's experts knew At times, the engagement team acted more as advocates for New Century, even when its practices were questioned by KPMG specialists who had greater knowledge of relevant accounting guidelines and industry practice. When one KPMG specialist persisted in objecting to a particular accounting practice ... an objection that was well founded and later led to a change in the Company's practice -the lead KPMG engagement partner told him in an email: "I am very disappointed we are still discussing this. As far as I am concerned we are done. The client thinks we are done. All we are going to do is piss everybody off". "The first requirement is to continue to be at the beck and call of RM, his sons and his staff, appear when wanted and provide whatever is requested. The second requirement is … to continue to avoid making errors in exceptionally difficult and exceptionally demanding circumstances".
The report concluded that auditors "consistently agreed accounting treatments of transactions that served the interest of RM and not those of the trustees or the beneficiaries of 7 In June 2006, Japanese regulators ordered ChuoAoyama PricewaterhouseCoopers to suspend part of its statutory auditing services for two months. Subsequently, the firm changed its name but many clients deserted and it was forced to fold its operations (Sikka, 2008a Attention also focused on Messrs Nunn Hayward, a medium-size firm which had held the office of the auditor since the inception of the business in 1990.
A disciplinary report by the UK accountancy profession (Joint Disciplinary Schemes, 2004) noted that "The financial statements of Versailles for the year ending 28th February 1996 were sent by Mr Clough, the Finance Director, to the shareholders, filed with AIM and approved by the shareholders at an AGM before Nunn Hayward had completed its audit. Although Nunn Hayward question whether the audit certificate was false, in our judgment it plainly was because on its face it purported to have been provided by Nunn Hayward when in fact it had not been. The point taken by Nunn Hayward is that when in fact they completed their audit work they did approve the financial statements in the form originally filed and bearing a purported audit certificate. Mr Clough informed Mr Dales 12 that he had hoodwinked the Board into believing that the audit had been completed. The matter was discussed between Nunn Hayward's partners and they properly obtained advice from Solicitors Messrs Druces and Attlee who were informed by Mr Dales that the Finance Director had "done a wobbly". This is to be contrasted with the admitted deliberate act of hoodwinking the Board. Messrs Druces and Attlee gave advice and referred to the auditors' right of resignation but Mr Dales said that this was a big fee account and that his firm did not want to resign. The audit had not been completed earlier by Nunn Hayward because Versailles had been unable to provide access to basic documentation in spite of requests. The actions of Mr Clough should have been regarded by competent auditors as a fundamental breach of trust. Whereas Nunn Hayward did call for advice from Solicitors, Mr Dales and the firm seem to have accepted the view expressed by Versailles's legally qualified Company Secretary that "although clearly there was a problem it was largely a technicality provided that the audit could be completed without any adjustments being necessary to the accounts. In fact Nunn Hayward signed their audit certificate on unchanged financial statements after little further work. Mr Nunn [another partner] carried out a "hot review". Although Druces & Attlee were advised by Nunn Hayward that Versailles were prepared to provide an indemnity and to circulate a notice with the papers for the necessary Extraordinary General Meeting explaining the circumstances and fully exonerating them, and although Druces & Attlee agreed a form of wording with Versailles, in fact no indemnity was provided and the final company circular for the AGM contained the words "due to an oversight" rather than the text agreed by Druce & Attlee "due to an oversight at the company". Thus shareholders never came close to being informed of the true situation, and Nunn Hayward adopted a craven attitude designed to minimise damage to Versailles" (Joint Disciplinary Scheme, 2004, paragraphs 50-53).
Unlike employees, pension scheme members, unsecured creditors and other risk-bearers, shareholders have the statutory rights to question auditors at AGMs. They can use the opportunity to elicit information, but whether they get frank replies is another matter. Here is an extract from a UK government However, if a shareholder asks further information I propose to reply as follows:
"In recent years we have experienced certain difficulties in obtaining necessary information for our audit and being sure that all relevant explanations have been provided to us. In the final outcome we have been satisfied that we have received all such information and explanation; otherwise this would have been reflected in our audit report. However the situation created by these difficulties caused us to agree with the directors that we would not seek re-election at this meeting, a step we are permitted to take under the provisions of the Companies Act."
If there should be a follow-up question asking for more information about the difficulties referred to in the foregoing statement I would propose to reply as follows:
"There was no one matter which in itself caused us to reach this agreement with the directors. In view of this, there is nothing more that can be added to the answer that has already been given" I would not intend to give any more information nor to respond to any other question.
Yours sincerely"
The auditing model in practice is further complicated by the fact that auditors are permitted to sell consultancy services to their audit clients. This increases auditor fee dependency upon companies and can impair their perceived and actual independence (Briloff, 1990) . Mautz and Sharaf (1961) argue that effective independent auditors must have "freedom from client control …be aware of the various pressures, some obvious and subtle, which tend to influence his attitude and thereby to erode slowly but surely his independence. … Non-auditing services result in an identification of the interests of auditors and their clients … (pp. 278-279). Ever since the dawn of modern auditing, there have been concerns about the sale of non-auditing services to audit clients (Chandler and Edwards, 1994 ) and continue to be repeated (see Gwilliam, 1987 for a review, also see Mautz and Sharaf, 1961; Simunic, 1984; Powers Jr et al., 2002) . Such concerns have also been aired in critical reports published by the UK government. For example, a UK government report on the collapse of Roadships Limited concluded that "Independence is essential to enable auditors to retain their objectivity which enables their work to be relied upon by outsiders. It may be destroyed in many ways but significantly in three; firstly, by auditors having a financial interest in the company; secondly, by the auditors being controlled in the broadest sense by the company; and thirdly, if the work which is being done is in fact work which has been done previously by the auditors themselves acting as accountants … we do not accept that there can be the requisite degree of watchfulness where a man is checking his own figures or those a colleague ......... for these reasons we do not believe that [the auditors] ever achieved the standards of independence necessary for a wholly objective audit" (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1976, paras 243, 249 and 250) .
Another report (UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1979) concluded that "in our view the principle of the auditor first compiling and then reporting upon a profit forecast is not considered to be a good practice for it may impair their ability to view the forecast objectively and must endanger the degree of independence essential to this work" (p. (Sikka, 2008a) . Eventually, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) prosecuted because the firm entered into a business relationship with software giant PeopleSoft, one of its audit clients. In a withering court judgement, the judge stated that "The overwhelming evidence is that during the relevant period, EY's day-to-day operations were profit-driven and ignored considerations of auditor independence in business relationships with PeopleSoft. EY's partners shared in the pooled revenues of the firm's three practice areas, and each EY partner was evaluated annually on his or her achievement toward five preset goals, one of which was sales. … EY committed repeated violations of the auditor independence standards by conduct that was reckless, highly unreasonable, and negligent. It has not acknowledged that it has committed any violations, and it has offered no assurance that it will not commit violations in the future. … This was not a situation of an isolated mistake or confusion over a complicated, technical issue. These violations occurred over an extended period. They were committed by professionals throughout the firm who exhibited no caution or concern for the rules of auditor independence in connection with business relationships with an audit client. … the firm paid only perfunctory attention to the rules on auditor independence in business dealings with a client, and that EY reliance on a "culture of consulting" to achieve compliance with the rules on auditor independence was a sham. … EY partners acted recklessly and negligently in committing willful and deliberate violations of well established rules that govern auditor independence standards in connection with business relationships with an audit client. EY's misconduct was blatant and occurred after the Commission and a court accepted EY's representations that it would observe the very same auditor independence rules …" (US Securities Exchange Commission, After examination of extensive evidence, the Senate Committee stated that "KPMG's tax products also raise auditor independence issues. Three of the banks involved in BLIPS, FLIP, and OPIS 15 (Deutsche Bank, HVB, and Wachovia Bank), employ KPMG to audit their financial statements. SEC rules state that auditor independence is impaired when an auditor has a direct or material indirect business relationship with an audit client. KPMG apparently attempted to address the auditor independence issue by giving its clients a choice of banks to use in the transactions, including at least one bank that was not a KPMG audit client. It is unclear, however, whether individuals actually could choose what bank to use. Moreover, it is unclear how providing clients with a choice of banks alleviated KPMG's conflict of interest, since it still had a direct or material, indirect business relationship with a bank whose financial statements were certified by KPMG auditors.
A second set of auditor independence issues involves KPMG's decision to market tax products to its own audit clients. By engaging in this marketing tactic, KPMG not only took advantage of its auditorclient relationship, but also created a conflict of interest in those cases where it successfully sold a tax product to an audit client. The conflict of interest arises when the KPMG auditor reviewing the client's financial statements is required, as part of that review, to examine the client's tax return and its use of unusual tax strategies. In such situations, KPMG is, in effect, auditing its own work" (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2003, p. 15-16).
The Senate Committee recommended that the newly formed "Public Company Accounting Oversight Board should strengthen and finalize proposed rules restricting certain accounting firms from providing aggressive tax services to their audit clients, charging companies a contingent fee for providing tax services, and using aggressive marketing efforts to promote generic tax products to potential clients" (US Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations, 2005, p. 8).
Audit Quality
There have been considerable concerns about quality, especially when companies experience unforeseen financial difficulties, or collapse soon after receiving unqualified audit reports (Mitchell et al., 1992; Edwards and Shaoul, 1999 ; UK Department of Trade and Industry, 1976; 1979 2001) . A former President of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland (ICAS) said, "All of the failures we looked into would have been found if anyone other than the audit junior had looked at the bank statements. ….. One public company failed with a £50 million black hole in one of its subsidiaries. The subsidiary had net assets of £5 million -and the auditors did not find it. If they had looked at the bank reconciliation, they would have raised so many enquiries they would have found the black hole. Big firms are no longer carrying out audits. They audit in helicopters and circle clients from a few thousand feet and take pictures. No one gets out of the helicopter and kicks tyres. It's no longer audit, it's more akin to due diligence" (cited in Cousins et al., 2004, p. 14) . In a survey, 54% of the Finance Directors of major UK companies felt that the quality of audits had declined noticeably. The views included, "The days when the auditors used to carry out stringent checks are well gone …. These days the auditors ask questions to the company accountant and accept their word ….. Audits try to avoid "dangerous" areas and have more opt-out clauses to put the onus on the management. Many are concerned about the use of audit as a means of getting into a company to sell other services" (Accountancy Age, 6 November 2003).
What counts as 'quality' in auditing is inevitably the outcome of power, politics and social relations (Power, 1999; , but a dominant view is that 'quality' or objectivity is constructed by using appropriate auditing techniques and having a good set of working papers to demonstrate professional judgement (Auditing Practices Board, 2004b ). This worldview is deeply embedded within institutions and a variety of auditing standards that require auditors to evaluate internal controls, conduct analytical reviews and make assessment of whether a business is a going concern. Such strategies lay claims to knowledge bases, equate quality with compliance with techniques and rules and portray auditors as experts who can mediate uncertainty and construct an objective state of business affairs. The technicist view of audit quality is further enforced by regulatory reports which list the failure of auditing firms to use prescribed techniques or adopt commonsensical steps (for example, see PCAOB, 2007a PCAOB, , 2007b PCAOB, , 2007c PCAOB, , 2007d .
Regulators pay little attention to social and organisational context of auditing.
Little connection is made between the profit motive of accounting firms and how accountants are socialised in serving the clients (Anderson-Gough et al., 2000) . Company audits, in common with other products and services, are manufactured within a social and organisational setting, which naturalises worldviews and values and also have unanticipated outcomes. For example, audits are generally labour intensive and within firms there are pressures to increase profits. Individuals are subjected to performance appraisals and often their promotion and financial rewards depend on contribution to profits.
Firms can increase profits by charging higher fess, but in a competitive market clients may be able to resist such moves. Firms might use more audit juniors or change the mix of junior and senior staff to reduce costs. An alternative is to squeeze time budgets and expect audit staff to work week-ends and evenings to complete the tasks. Firms may also undertake less stringent audits. A body of research (for example, see Willett and Page, 1996; Otley and Pierce, 1996; McNamara and Liyanarachchi, 2008) Otley and Pierce (1996) describe as "premature sign-off and other forms of audit quality reduction behaviour" (p. 46). The pressures to come under time budgets, may help to increase profits and mediate internal performance appraisals, but they also pose questions about the relationship between profit and audit quality.
In principle, the pressures to dilute audit quality could be checked by stringent liability laws, but these have also been diluted in recent years. Traditionally, auditing firms have traded as partnerships with each partner having 'joint and several' liability (Napier, 1998) . However, as corporate clients and accounting firms grew in size and significance, accountancy firms demanded and secured a series of liability concessions (for details see Cousins et al., 2004; Sikka, 2008b) . In the UK, these include the right to trade as limited liability companies and enabling companies to purchase insurance cover for auditors. The 1990s are characterised by a major shift (in the Western world) from industrial capitalism to finance capitalism where money itself has become a commodity (Bello et al., 2000; Stiglitz, 2003; Morris, 2008; Soros, 2008) . Due to technological developments, money can easily roam the world.
The House of Lords' judgement in Caparo Industries plc v Dickman & Others
Rather than directly investing in the production of goods and services, corporations make money by placing clever bets (gambling or hedging) on interest rate movements, exchange rates, security prices, derivatives, commodities and land speculation. The outcomes of such bets could be anything from zero (even negative) to several million pounds/dollars and depend upon future events, cash flows, volatility and rapid, often property values, plentiful supply of money and cheap credit (Morris, 2008; Soros, 2008) . The dynamics of such markets are only partially understood.
According to Nick Leeson, the man who brought down Barings bank (Leeson and Whitley, 1996) , "the regulators, auditors and compliance officials are constantly playing catch-up. Their understanding and knowledge of the markets and instruments being traded are just not keeping pace" (Daily Mail, 15 September 2007 18 ).
Transformation of capitalism, market volatility and its consequences for auditing practices rarely form any part of professional accounting education (Sikka et al., 2007) even though auditors routinely report on businesses deeply involved in such markets. Consider the case of Long Term Capital Management (LTCM), a US based hedge fund that collapsed in 1998 (Dunbar, 2001) . LTCM board of directors included experienced bankers, financiers and Professors Myron Scholes and Robert Merton, joint winners of the1997 Nobel Prize in Economics. They are also credited with developing the 'option pricing theory', a model that takes account of market volatility to derive valuation of complex financial securities (Black and Scholes, 1973; Merton, 1973) . LTCM essentially placed clever bets, or arbitraged, on the price of government bonds and corporate securities. It boasted returns of 40% on its investment and always received a clean bill of health from its auditors. In 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION
This paper has sought to raise some questions about the appropriateness of the auditing model, audit quality and the auditability of some transactions and businesses. It is common practice for the state to appoint and remunerate auditors for health and safety, hygiene, taxes, immigration and many other fields. In such arenas, auditors are neither directly selected nor remunerated by the auditee. As a result they are independent and are indeed respected and often feared. for hospitals, local authorities and public bodies (McSweeney, 1988; Kelly, 2003) . Auditors are generally banned 27 from selling consultancy services to audit clients. In addition to financial statements, they also have to report on the efficiency and effectiveness of the client. The drafters of legislation also envisaged a similar arrangement for audits of major companies (Heseltine, 1987) , but this never came to fruition. Such a system could be selectively applied to large corporate bodies and was envisaged in the 1930s legislation that created the US Securities Exchange Commission (SEC). In the words of Lynn Turner, for chief accountant of the SEC: "when the legislation creating the SEC was first drafted in the early 1930s, it included a provision making the 25 Its role was extended and consolidated by the National Health Service and Community Care Act 1990 and the Audit Commission Act 1998. 26 These can be private accounting firms or auditors appointed by the state. 27 They are permitted to prepare information for some statutory returns for total fees of £25,000 or less. There will inevitably be resistance to such proposals on ideological grounds, or the claims that the state apparatuses are somehow more bureaucratic and inefficient. Whilst the proposals may not be a panacea for the problems afflicting the auditing industry, at the very least it can give auditors independence from company directors and may persuade them to adopt more stringent strategies. They can also strengthen regulation of sensitive industries.
Overall, little is known about how audits are produced or manufactured within auditing firms. The contention of this paper is that organisational value systems are a key ingredient of the production of 'quality' and should be examined. The commercial concerns inform every aspect of auditing. This paper has highlighted just two variables which have a bearing on audit quality. embraced by the state with the added benefit that auditors would be independent of audit clients. There may also be benefits in that the regulators may gain early insights into the problems afflicting banks and financial institutions and may be able to adopt more effective regulatory strategies.
Hopefully, a vigorous debate would further explore the issues.
Traditionally auditors have relied upon tangible evidence to verify financial statements. Such approaches are increasingly problematised by shifts in capitalism where money is made through complex financial instruments and clever bets. The value of such contracts depends on future uncertain events in highly volatile markets. The paper drew attention to major financial institutions whose asset values collapsed within days of receiving clean audit reports. Perhaps, the time has come to acknowledge that some aspects of financial statements can no longer be audited by traditional auditing technologies. It may be preferable to provide relevant information to stakeholders and invite them to arrive at their own preferred valuations. Such developments may be resented by auditors whose 'professional' and expert credentials are based upon the claims that they can somehow construct an objective state of business affairs. Inevitably, the future of auditing practices will be shaped by power and politics.
